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Abstract 
This paper uses a dataset built by the author on the basis of raw data taken from 
different national surveys to carry out an investigation into the socio-economic 
determinants of couples’ childbearing decisions in Italy. Since having children is in 
most cases a “couple matter”, the analysis accounts for the characteristics of both the 
aspiring parents. Our results contradict theoretical predictions according to which the 
increase in the opportunity cost of motherhood connected to higher female labour 
participation is responsible for the fall in fertility. On the contrary, the instability of the 
women’s work status (i.e. their being occasional, precarious, and low-paid workers) 
reveals to be a significant and strong dissuasive deterrent discouraging the decision to 
have children. Couples with unemployed women are less likely to plan childbearing as 
well. Other relevant explanatory variables are age, current family size, and the strength 
of family ties.  
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1. Introduction 
Sometime in the next few years (if it hasn’t happened already) the world will reach a milestone: half 
of humanity will be having only enough children to replace itself. That is, the fertility rate of half 
countries will be 2.1 or below, making the growth of their population slow down and eventually 
stabilize. This is not necessarily a bad news. According to the United Nations Population Division 
(2009), fast population growth, fueled by high fertility, hinders the reduction of poverty and the 
achievement of other development goals. However, in countries experiencing a dramatic population 
ageing like Italy, the fall in fertility brings about some worrying side effects. First, low fertility 
substantially reduces the size of the labour force. Second, the decline in the workforce blights the 
actuarial sustainability of the current pension system. Furthermore, with very low fertility, the fall 
in the labour supply is most severe at the young ages. Young workers are the main assimilators of 
new technology, and countries that have a shortage of young skilled workers are more vulnerable to 
competition (McDonald, 2008, McDonald and Temple, 2006). 
Theory commonly relates the fall in fertility to the rise of female participation to the labour market 
(Willis, 1973, Becker, 1981, Cigno, 1991). In the 70s, consistently with such predictions, the higher 
level of education, and the related prospects of better work positions and higher earnings, raised the 
opportunity cost of not working, thereby causing a postponement of childbearing decisions in turn 
leading to a fall in fertility rates (Adsera, 2004, D’Addio and D’Ercole, 2005).  
However, the relationship between female participation and fertility has changed significantly in the 
last two decades. In most EU countries, the sign of the correlation has now become positive (Ahn 
and Mira, 2002, Morgan, 2003, Engelhardt et al., 2004, Billari and Kohler, 2004; for an alternative 
view, see Kögel, 2004). Still, the shift does not concern Italy, which, despite having one of the 
lowest female participation rates in Europe, still suffers from a markedly lower fertility. The Italian 
exception has been explained as the result of institutional and policy differences in respect to 
Nordic countries where more generous protection schemes have been implemented to reconcile 
motherhood with work (Bernhardt, 1993, Gauthier, 1996, Adsera, 2004, Engelhardt and Prskawetz, 
2004, Del Boca and Sauer, 2009).  
The empirical literature investigating the fall in fertility focuses almost only on women’s economic 
conditions and on actual fertility rates, somewhat neglecting the facts that: 1) in EU countries, the 
desired fertility rate is significantly higher than the actual rate (Eurostat, 2001, Adsera, 2006). 2) 
Family planning decisions are in most cases – as the term itself suggests - a family matter or, better, 
a “couple-matter”. 
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Here we argue that, besides female participation, on the one side, and the pressure of the “biological 
clock” and of social and cultural factors, on the other side, one of the main issues which a woman 
addresses when planning the decision to have a child is: can we – i.e. my partner and me - afford it? 
Thus, rather than analyzing the labour market participation only of women - which has already been 
fruitfully addressed by a series of previous studies – we aim at adding some new insights to the 
debate by focusing on the “economic sustainability” of childbearing decisions at the family level. 
This choice is also related to the fact that, in very most cases, childbearing is conceived in the 
context of a steady relationship. In Italy, aspiring single mothers and fathers are in fact still quite 
rare and, in some case, even thwarted by law (see Lalli, 2009, for an exhaustive overview). 
The empirical studies tracing back the differences between Northern and Southern Europe to the  
institutional framework of female participation reasonably account for social policies related to 
childcare assistance, parental leave arrangements, and the availability of part-time positions for 
women. Besides few exceptions (see for example Adsera, 2004), the stability of the aspiring 
parents’ work status or, in other words, their “labour precariousness”, has so far been neglected. It is 
worth noting that the concept of labour precariousness is in general disregarded by the conventional 
literature, which considers it more as an obvious and somewhat desirable side effect of flexibility 
rather than as a crucial factor of workers’ well-being. 
This paper aims to improve our understanding of family planning choices by analyzing the 
economic and social determinants of the Italian couples’ childbearing aspirations. Together with a 
series of conventional factors already considered by previous studies, like for example employment 
and marriage, we test the role of new labour market-related explanatory variables which may 
influence the economic sustainability of the decision to have children. In particular, we focus on the 
stability of the work status. The main hypothesis we want to test here is that having a precarious job 
(i.e. unstable, low paid, and with scarce guarantees) is a dissuasive deterrent from planning 
parenthood, instead of encouraging childbearing through a decrease in its opportunity cost for 
women.   
Then, we carry out a first exploration of the role of the strength of family ties, or what the literature 
generally refers to as “bonding social capital”. Social capital has in fact been proven to be a 
significant variable for the explanation of differences in the agents’ behaviour across the Italian 
regions (Heliwell and Putnam, 1995, Guiso et al., 2004, Peri, 2004, Sabatini, 2008). 
Raw data are drawn from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the 
Bank of Italy which covers 7,768 households composed of 19,551 individuals and 13,009 income-
earners. Social capital is measured by latent indicators synthesized through principal component 
analyses performed on survey data collected by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) in 
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2006. Relevant territorial indicators are taken from several other national data sources including the 
Istat’s Quarterly survey on the labour force. 
Based on probit models, our results contradict conventional economic theory predicting that the 
increase in the opportunity cost of motherhood connected to higher participation and wage rates 
necessarily leads to a decrease in fertility. Rather, we find evidence that being unemployed is a 
significant deterrent from planning to have children. More in general, women's labour instability 
discourages childbearing aspirations. Couples where women are precarious (i.e. atypical, 
temporary, and low-guaranteed) workers are in fact much less likely to plan to have (more) children 
in the future. 
Other relevant explanatory variables are age (both of men and women), current family size, the 
perceived economic well-being of the family, and the strength of family ties. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we offer a synthetic 
background on Italy. We then describe our data and present a series of probit models. First, we test 
some traditional explanations of family planning decisions. Then, we introduce dummy measures of 
the precariousness of work status as new, main, explanatory variables. Finally, we test the influence 
of bonding social capital. We conclude by considering the policy lessons of the Italian case. 
 
2. Background  
The relationship between education, labour market participation, and fertility has changed 
significantly over time. Until the second half of the 80s, higher levels of female education and 
labour participation were associated with lower fertility rates. Starting from the 90s, these 
correlations were partially reversed. The participation of women to the labour market continued to 
increase in all countries, but fertility rates started to decline at a lower rate or, in some cases, began 
to grow again. However, relevant differences can be observed. In the European Union, the countries 
with the lowest fertility (Spain, Italy, and Greece) are those with relatively low levels of female 
labour force participation, while the countries with higher fertility rates (Denmark, France, and 
Sweden) show a relatively high female participation to the labour market. Italy, especially in the 
Northern and Central regions, became the title-holder of the so-called “lowest-low” fertility (Kohler 
et al. 2002, Castiglioni and Della Zuanna, 2009). 
According to the most recent data, the average number of children per fertile woman is now 1.33 
(Istat, 2007). This is one of the lowest fertility rates in developed countries and is the result of a 
gradual decrease in fertility started at the beginning of the last century. The fall in fertility has been 
accompanied by significant changes in the chronology of the couples’ family planning choices. 
Mothers’ average age at the first childbirth, which has been quite stable around 25 for a long time, 
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gradually raised to the current threshold of 29 (Istat, 2007). As a consequence, the average family 
size radically changed as well. Currently, the prevalent family model implies an only child. It is 
noteworthy that the event of the first childbirth has been inappreciatively influenced by the fertility 
fall: Italian women continue to show a high propensity to motherhood. It is the second childbirth 
that has become an even more rare event. The decrease in fertility cannot thus be attributed to a 
negative attitude towards procreation. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that, according to 
the Istat’s Survey on Births (2007), the desired fertility rate is significantly higher than the actual 
one. Such a background suggests that further investigations are required to understand the 
determinants of this gap or, in other words, what curbs the couples’ ambition to conceive a second 
child. 
 
3. Main hypotheses: the importance of precariousness. 
First, we test some traditional explanations of family planning decisions advanced by the theoretical 
and empirical debate. The models presented in section 5.1 are intended to assess the influence 
exerted on childbearing intentions by the age, educational qualification, and labour market 
participation of both the possible parents, as well as the couple’s marital status, the perception of the 
family’s economic well-being and the current family size. According to microeconomic theory, 
female participation should lower fertility rates by raising the opportunity cost of motherhood 
(Willis, 1973, Becker, 1981, Cigno, 1991, Ermish, 2003). Until the first half of the 80s, this 
hypothesis has been supported by data. However, according to a series of recent empirical studies, 
the negative relationship between female participation and fertility no longer holds. The sign of the 
correlation has now turned into positive in several highly developed countries (Ahn and Mira, 2002, 
Morgan, 2003, Engelhardt et al., 2004, Billari and Kohler, 2004). On this regard, it is noteworthy 
that the empirical evidence is conflicting. For example, Kögel (2004) shows that the time-series 
association between fertility and female employment does not demonstrate a change in sign.  
At this stage of the analysis, our study differentiates itself from the previous literature by: 1) 
focusing on childbearing intentions, instead of accounting solely for actual fertility, in order to 
better evaluate the determinants of the decision to have (more) children; 2) assessing at the micro 
level the possible role of a series of economic features of both the components of the couple, instead 
of focusing on women only.  
Then, in section 5.2, we test our new hypotheses by introducing measures of the precariousness of 
the aspiring parents’ work status as explanatory variables. The basic idea is that the main issue that 
a couple has to address when considering the decision to have children is: can we afford it? We 
argue that if the aspiring parents hold precarious positions in the labour market - e.g. they have 
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unstable, low-paid,  and not guaranteed jobs - they are less likely to have the time and the material 
resources for expanding their family. In its “Classification of Status in Employment”, the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines “precarious” workers as either: (a) workers whose 
contract of employment leads to the classification of the incumbent as belonging to the groups of 
“casual workers”
1
; (b) “short-term workers” or “seasonal workers”; or (c) workers whose contract 
of employment will allow the employing enterprise or person to terminate the contract at short 
notice. As stated in the introduction, the concept of labour precariousness is generally disregarded 
by the conventional literature, which considers it more as a side effect of flexibility rather than as a 
crucial, potentially negative, factor of workers’ well-being. This view can be hardly generalized to 
Mediterranean countries like Italy. Here, precarious workers are generally characterized by low 
employment conditions in terms of pay, employment security, sickness and parental benefits, 
balance between work and private life. They are usually provided with less work-related training 
and enjoy scarce prospects of building a career. Moreover, such negative labour market conditions 
are associated with an unfavourable institutional and policy framework. While in Nordic countries 
the effects of flexibility on well-being are tempered by more efficient childcare systems and 
generous parental benefits, in Italy public protection schemes are in most cases designed to meet the 
needs of permanent workers (see Ferrera, 2005, and Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004, for exhaustive 
reviews on the Italian welfare state).  
Labour precariousness can thus be seen as a barrier to social integration that may destroy human 
and social capital: a high level of flexibility on employment hinders training and qualification and, 
at the same time, hampers the consolidation of social ties, both inside and outside the workplace. 
While a stable and satisfactory work provides not only income, but also an identity and a “sense of 
belonging”, precariousness generates discouragement and distrust towards labour market 
institutions that, at the macro level, may result in a more distrustful society. In Italy, the negative 
connotation of precariousness is further testified by the worrying growth of social conflicts 
associated with the constant increase in the number of atypical and unstable workers. 
In this study, we attempt to assess the different childbearing intentions of first job seekers and of 
unemployed, not employed, atypical, and precarious workers, as well as of self-employed workers.  
Since the high exposure to the risks of job loss, wage variability, and intermittent unemployment 
raise the uncertainty on future incomes, making difficult any form of long-term planning of life 
activities such as marriage and procreation, we expect a negative association between the 
precariousness of potential parents and their childbearing intentions. 
                                                 
1
 The ILO defines “casual”  workers as having an explicit or implicit contract of employment which is not expected to 
continue for more than a short period.  
 7 
After the evaluation of the range of micro characteristics described above, we then try to assess the 
possible role of cultural and economic factors measured at the macro level. Some theoretical 
studies, often grouped under the common label of second demographic transition theories, 
emphasize the role of culture and social norms (Ariès, 1980, Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986, van 
de Kaa 1987, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1998). This strand of the literature attributes the fall in 
fertility to a basic shift toward values emphasizing “the rights and self-fulfillment of individuals” 
(van de Kaa, 1987, p. 5). According to van der Kaa (1987), dominant views have moved away from 
traditional family-oriented values, resulting in a  relevant increase in divorce, cohabitation, and non-
marital childbearing. However, the empirical evidence shows that the European countries currently 
having the lowest fertility rates are those exhibiting the strongest commitment to the traditional 
forms of family formation, with relatively low divorce, non-marital cohabitation, and illegitimacy 
rates. 
In this paper, we attempt to add some insights by  testing the influence of a cultural factor like the 
strength of family ties. Here, we expect stronger family ties to be associated with higher levels of 
fertility. In our empirical analysis, following Sabatini (2008, 2009a) we discriminate between the 
“intensity” and the “quality” of family ties, to shed light on the possibly diverse effects of these two 
dimensions of bonding social capital.  
 
4. Data  
The paper draws upon cross-section data collected by the author on the basis of several national 
survey sources. Variables considered within the empirical analysis are in very most cases synthetic, 
latent, indicators derived from raw data through a series of methods ranging from simple recoding 
to principal component analysis (PCA)
2
.  
The main source is the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the Bank 
of Italy in 2006. The SHIW covers 7,768 households composed of 19,551 individuals and 13,009 
income-earners and collects data on individual income, wealth, human capital and a range of 
relevant socio-economic behaviours and perceptions. In the 2006 wave of the survey, an interesting 
question on family planning was included in the questionnaire: “Do you plan to have (more) 
children in the future?” where possible answers were 1) yes, 2) not now, we will think about it later, 
3) No, we don’t want any (more) children, and 4) No, but we would have liked to have (more) 
children
3
. The question was asked only to couples in which the woman was under 46 and offers a 
                                                 
2
 Indicators are described in detail in Appendix A. More detailed techinical notes on their construction are available by 
request to the author. 
3
 The questionnaire and the microdata are available on the Bank of Italy’s web site.  
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good opportunity for an investigation into the socio-economic determinants of childbearing 
intentions at the micro level. 
The sub-sample interested by this question includes 1,742 couples, i.e. 1,742 men plus 1,742 
women. Responses are provided by the head of the household, who was asked to speak in the name 
of the couple. The derived dataset used for the analysis thus includes 1,742 cases, corresponding to 
the heads of  the household, to which we have attached variables describing the socio-economic 
characteristics of their (1,742) partners.  
In our view, the fact of accounting for couples, instead of considering solely women, adds relevant 
hints to the analysis. The decision to have children is in fact in most cases a couple matter, and is 
influenced by the socio-economic conditions of both the partners. It is worth noting that the SHIW 
covers only “conventional” couples formed by a woman and a man living together. Homosexual 
couples and singles are not included in the sample. Besides any ethical and political consideration, 
this choice seems to be representative of the Italian scenario. Italy is in fact usually regarded as the 
European country with the strongest family bonds and religious institutions. Aspiring single 
parents, whether women or men, are not only discouraged by cultural and ideological pressures. In 
some cases, they are even thwarted by law, to the point that people needing treatments like embryo 
donation and in vitro fertilization are forced to refer to foreign health facilities in neighbouring 
countries like France, Spain, and Switzerland (see Lalli, 2009, for an overview). As already outlined 
in section 3, Italy’s levels of divorces, non-marital cohabitations, and illegitimacy rates are among 
the lowest in Europe.  
Measures of social capital are obtained as results of principal component analyses (PCAs) 
performed on raw data aggregated at the regional level by the Istat in its Multipurpose surveys. 
Multipurpose surveys are carried out by the Istat to investigate social phenomena by means of face-
to-face interviews on a sample of 24,000 households, roughly corresponding to 50,000 individuals. 
Other territorial indicators are taken from different data sources which will be specified in Section 
5.3.  
 
5. Results 
The hypotheses described in Section 3 are tested through a series of probit analyses. The dependent 
variable of the primary regression model is the response to the question: “Do you plan to have 
(more) children in the future?”. Because of the limited nature of the dependent variable, we follow 
the well-established strategy to code this as a binary model with unity assigned to the response 
“Yes” and zero to the remaining categories. 
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5.1 Education and participation 
First, we test some conventional hypotheses addressing the role of education, labour participation, 
and civil status. Independent variables accounted for at this and in the following stages of the 
analysis are as follows: 
 
• An indicator of women’s and men’s participation to the labour market. The index ranges from 
1 (lowest participation) to 8 (highest) and is described in detail in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
The classification takes into account two main parameters: the work status and the type of 
contract. The latter plays a fundamental role for two main reasons: a) as outlined in Section 3, 
diverse types of contract imply strong differences in terms of  risks of job loss, wage 
variability, intermittent unemployment, training opportunities, parental benefits, and other 
guarantees; b) a difference in the type of contract may play a crucial role in determining the 
opportunity cost of childbearing as defined by microeconomic theory. 
• An indicator of women’s and men’s educational qualification, ranging from 1 (none) to 8 
(postgraduate qualification). See Table A2 for further details. 
• Men’s and women’s age, where the women’s age cannot be over 46 due to the sample design. 
• Marital status, coded as 1 if the couple is married and 0 in all the other cases. 
• Centre-North, a territorial dummy coded with unity if the couple lives in Northern or Central 
regions and 0 otherwise.  
• The perceived economic conditions of the family, given by the interviewees’ response to the 
question: “Is your household’s income sufficient to see you through to the end of the month?”, 
ranging on a scale from 1 (“with great difficulty”) to 6 (“very easily”). 
 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1, while probit estimates are described in Table 2. Detailed 
information on how variables were built are reported in Appendix A. 
As expected, the results indicate that childbearing intentions decrease with the age of both the 
partners, with the number of children already born, and for couples living in Central or Northern 
regions. Married couples are more likely to want (more) children, as well as couples where men 
hold a higher educational qualification and a better job position. Such result confirms that men do 
not generally have to face any trade-off between fatherhood and their professional career. On the 
contrary, men’s position in the labour market is likely to work as a factor reassuring the couple 
about the economic sustainability of its childbearing intentions. It is noteworthy that, even if the 
educational qualification of women is, on average, slightly higher, the gender divide in participation 
is still significant. Good perceived economic conditions are also a significant and positive predictor 
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of the decision to have children. A first interesting result is that the educational qualification and the 
labour market participation of women are not significant explanatory variables. In other words, 
females’ aspirations seem not to behave as factors diminishing childbearing intentions through the 
raise in the opportunity cost of motherhood, as predicted by microeconomic theory.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Obs Mean St. dev Min Max 
Married 1742 .9535017 .2106221 0 1 
Number of children 1742 1.442021 1.000759 0 7 
Man’s age 1742 40.58783 8.425163 20 69 
Woman’s age 1742 36.52755 8.227599 18 45 
Man’s education 1742 4.058553 1.473493 0 8 
Woman’s education 1742 4.145235 1.543223 0 8 
Man’s participation 1742 5.0907 1.921741 1 8 
Woman’s participation 1742 3.352468 2.284677 1 8 
Perceived Economic well-being 1742 3.11194 1.212412 1 6 
Centre-North 1742 .6647532 .4722122 0 1 
Man’s education*participation 1742 22.00175 12.7256 1 64 
Woman’s education*participation 1742 15.47229 13.2574 1 64 
 
 
 
Table 2. Model results 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. z P > | z | Coef. z P > | z | 
Married .9918152 4.94 0.000 .7948549 3.14 0.002 
Number of children -.598366 -11.45 0.000 -.638938 -11.64 0.000 
Man’s age -.040702 -6.78 0.000 -.034010 -2.87 0.004 
Woman’s age -.034837 -5.91 0.000 -.057685 -4.48 0.000 
Man’s education .0921572 2.50 0.012    
Woman’s education .0180198 0.48 0.631    
Man’s participation .0590218 2.22 0.026    
Woman’s participation -.004754 -0.22 0.826    
Perceived Economic well-being .1175236 2.68 0.007 .2389556 2.36 0.018 
Centre-North -.221709 -2.26 0.024 .1010039 -1.84 0.065 
Man’s education*participation    .0122577 3.00 0.003 
Woman’s education*participation    .0038389 0.45 0.654 
Observations 1742 1742 
Degrees of freedom 10 8 
Log-likelihood  -548.30758 -500.99235 
LR Chi-square 419.45 431.21 
 
The same results hold after the introduction, in model 2, of an interaction variable given by the 
product between participation and education. The educational qualification is in fact likely to 
influence workers’ professional ambitions helping to better define their involvement in the labour 
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market. For example, a temporary worker holding a postgraduate qualification (e.g. a young 
scholar) is likely to devote a higher effort to the improvement of her position in respect to a 
permanent worker holding a secondary school diploma (e.g. a white collar worker). The index 
ranges from 1 to 64, with higher values corresponding to greater professional expectations. Once 
again, women’s ambitions seem not to be a significant explanatory variable of the couples’ 
childbearing intentions. 
Both the models are statistically significant because the chi-square statistics are higher than the 
critical values for 10 and 8 degrees of freedom. Goodness of fit measures are briefly discussed in 
Appendix B. The addition of other potential explanatory variables does not change the significance, 
sign and size of the estimates, neither the goodness of fit of the model. In particular, in this and in 
the following regressions, we controlled for log real income, home ownership, home’s surface, the 
fact of having debts (in particular home loans), the state of health, the sector of activity, and the 
self-declared wealth, which all proved not to be significant predictors of the couples’ childbearing 
intentions
4
.   
 
5.2 Precariousness 
In this section, we introduce a series of dummies to assess the possible effect of work status on 
childbearing decisions. In particular, we test the importance of being: unemployed (whether first-
job seeker or not), self-employed, not employed (i.e. homemaker, student, non-paid volunteer, 
retired or pensioner), atypical worker (i.e. contingent worker on own account like occasional 
collaborator or project worker, or worker holding an unstable job with a temporary, or occasional or 
fixed term contract). In model 4, we adopt a more comprehensive definition of precariousness by 
introducing a different dummy which is coded with unity in case of contingent workers, employees 
with temporary contracts or fixed-term contracts (insert a note on a robustness check later), first-job 
seekers and unemployed workers. Probit estimates are reported in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Estimates are available by request to the author. 
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Table 3. Model results 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. z P > | z | Coef. z P > | z | 
Married 1.029782 5.07 0.000 1.031955 5.08 0.000 
Number of children -.610491 -11.50 0.000 -.610907 -11.51 0.000 
Man’s age -.041361 -6.81 0.000 -.041672 -6.90 0.000 
Woman’s age -.039289 -6.48 0.000 -.039354 -6.49 0.000 
Man’s education .1076055 2.89 0.004 .1089245 2.93 0.003 
Woman’s education .0305913 0.82 0.415 .0301106 0.80 0.421 
Self-employed man .2972598 2.65 0.008 .2981777 2.66 0.008 
Self-employed woman -.273641 -1.62 0.104 -.277317 -1.65 0.099 
Not employed man .0339422 0.08 0.936 .036438 0.09 0.931 
Not employed woman -.11775 -1.05 0.293 -.116908 -1.05 0.295 
Unemployed man -.198787 -0.74 0.459    
Unemployed woman -.512046 -2.45 0.014    
Atypical man -.055492 -0.32 0.751    
Atypical woman -.500278 -3.03 0.002    
Precarious man    -.095757 -0.63 0.529 
Precarious woman    -.501939 -3.59 0.000 
Perceived Economic well-being .228312 2.30 0.021    
Centre-North -.259827 -2.54 0.011    
Observations 1742 1742 
Degrees of freedom 16 14 
Log-likelihood  -540.49453 -540.61208 
LR Chi-square 435.07 434.84 
 
 
As in the previous regressions, having less children (or not having at all), being younger, married 
and in good economic conditions positively influence couples’ childbearing intentions.  
What is interesting here is that, contrarily to theoretical predictions, unemployed women and 
women working with temporary, atypical, contracts are significantly less likely to plan a 
motherhood. The explanation seems to be straightforward: far from being encouraged by the lower 
opportunity cost of childbearing, these workers probably feel too precarious to conceive the 
decision to have children. 
In most cases, temporary female workers with atypical contracts cannot enjoy any form of sickness 
or parental benefits. On the contrary, pregnancy is in most cases a cause of termination of the work 
relationship by the employer. Thus, female atypical workers generally have to face a trade-off 
between motherhood and their participation to the labour market. For couples in which the woman 
is unemployed, the decision to have a child is likely to sound as simply unsustainable.  
Interestingly, couples in which the man is self-employed show a higher probability to plan 
childbearing. 
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Similar results hold if we replace dummies for unemployed and atypical workers with the more 
comprehensive dummy coded as one in case of unemployed or first-job seekers or temporary 
workers. Once again, being on the fringes of the labour market seems to be a significant and strong 
dissuasive deterrent against childbearing for women. Models 3 and 4 are statistically significant 
since the chi-square statistics are higher than the critical values for 16 and 14 degrees of freedom. 
Goodness of fit measures are briefly discussed in Appendix B. 
 
5.3 Bonding social capital 
In this section we test the role of indicators measured at the regional level with the aim to capture 
other socio-cultural determinants of family planning decisions. In particular, we account for what 
the literature has often labelled as “bonding social capital”. The term “bonding” holds a negative 
connotation and refers to relationships between people who know each other well, i.e., family 
members, close friends, and neighbours (Gittel and Vidal, 1998). These relationships correspond to 
what Granovetter (1973) termed as “strong ties” and are often considered the building blocks for 
relationships with broader social networks. Starting from the pioneer study of Banfield (1958) on 
the Italian Mezzogiorno, bonding social capital has been generally considered as a factor of 
backwardness and economic underdevelopment (Putnam et al., 1993, Leonardi, 1995, Sabatini, 
2008, 2009a. See Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, and Sabatini, 2007, for an overview). However, 
strong family ties may positively affect the agents’ well-being through the provision of a series of 
services which are not accounted for by official statistics. To young couples, the family may 
provide fundamental services like financial help and babysitting. For this reason, we expect bonding 
social capital to have a positive influence on the sustainability of childbearing. Such effect may be 
reinforced by the commitment to reproduction which is generally associated to the strength of 
family ties.  
In this paper, following Sabatini (2009b), we carry out an attempt to take into account both the 
“intensity” and the “quality” of family ties. Intensity is measured through indicators of the family 
composition, of the spatial distance between family members’ places of residence, and of the 
frequency of the encounters. Adopted indicators are described in detail in Table C1 in Appendix C.  
The quality of relationships has been measured through indicators of grandparents helpfulness in 
taking care of their grandchildren, of the custom of non monetary gift exchange, and of the declared 
satisfaction with family relationships. The first indicator is aimed at capturing the strength of the 
mutual assistance mechanisms possibly taking place within the family. Gift exchange is considered 
as representative of the affection between family members. Making non monetary gifts is in fact a 
time consuming activity which requires a certain further effort to know the receiver’s tastes or 
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needs. Such an effort can hardly prescind from a good quality of relationships. Indicators are 
described in detail in Table C2, Appendix C. All the measures of bonding social capital are taken 
from the Istat’s (2006a, 2006b) multipurpose survey. 
A PCA is performed on ten indicators of the intensity and quality of family relationships. The first 
factorial plan explains the 67% of the variation of the data. PCA’s results reveal an interesting 
multidimensionality: the first axis is significantly and positively correlated with the indicators of 
family size, spatial proximity, and the frequency of encounters, and can thus be seen as a good 
measure for the intensity of family ties. The second axis is significantly and positively correlated 
with the willingness to take care of grandchildren, the custom of gift exchange, and the declared 
satisfaction with family relationships, and can thus be interpreted as a proxy for the quality of 
family relationships. Eigenvalues and factor loadings are reported in tables C3 and C4 in Appendix 
C. A possible interpretation is that too tight ties could turn into “bonds” leading to the reiteration of 
mechanic behaviours which not necessarily reflect a higher readiness to help one’s family members. 
However, higher scores on the first factor are likely to be connected with a strong cultural 
commitment to traditional family formation and, thus, to reproduction.  
Model results are reported in Table 4. The intensity of family ties is indeed significantly and 
positively associated with couples childbearing intentions. By contrast, the quality of family 
relationships is not statistically significant. Women’s labour instability is confirmed as a significant 
and strong factor discouraging motherhood. The importance of precariousness is thus robust to 
different model specifications. 
As in previous sections, regressions have been controlled for home ownership, home’s surface, the 
fact of having debts (in particular home loans), the state of health, the sector of activity, and the 
self-declared wealth. Moreover, in this section, we controlled for a series of territorial indicators 
aimed at capturing the labour market conditions (e.g. unemployment rate, female employment rate, 
female young unemployment rate, self-employed women rate, black labour, and gender gap in 
labour participation), taken from the Istat’s (2006c) quarterly survey on the labour force. All these 
variables were not statistically significant or, in some cases, they were significant but the size of 
their effect was negligible. 
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Table 4. Model results 
 Model 5 
 Coef. z P > | z | 
Married .969215 4.78 0.000 
Number of children -.6075831 -11.57 0.000 
Man’s age -.0410645 -6.82 0.000 
Woman’s age -.0378982 -6.30 0.000 
Man’s education .1070227 2.91 0.004 
Woman’s education .0284004 0.76 0.447 
Precarious man -.1226801 -0.81 0.420 
Precarious woman -.4327339 -3.33 0.001 
Perceived Economic well-being .1280443 3.05 0.002 
Intensity of family ties .0646035 3.06 0.002 
Quality of family ties -.0221364 -0.47 0.640 
Observations 1742 
Degrees of freedom 11 
Log-likelihood  -543.20673 
LR Chi-square 429.65 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Besides confirming the reliability of conventional explanations like civil status, age, and economic 
well-being, the empirical analysis in this paper contradicts some of the statements of 
microeconomic theory and introduces a new relevant explanation of the postponement of 
childbearing: the instability of females’ work status. In the Italian labour market, being a precarious 
worker is a strong dissuasive deterrent from planning a motherhood. The theoretical predictions 
according to which female participation may be responsible for the fall in fertility are not supported 
by data. On the contrary, unemployed women, far from being encouraged to childbearing by the 
lower opportunity cost of leaving the labour market, are definitely less likely to plan to have 
children.  
These findings add some interesting insights to the debate on the fall in fertility. As outlined in the 
review of the literature, many authors have related the “Italian puzzle”, i.e. the combination of low 
female participation with very low fertility, to differences in the institutional and policy framework. 
In Nordic countries, where more generous policies on parental arrangements and childcare 
assistance have been implemented, the negative correlation between participation and fertility has in 
fact been reversed. Previous studies suggest the creation of more part-time jobs and the 
improvement of childcare assistance as possible ways to fill the gap (Del Boca and Sauer, 2009, Del 
Boca et al., 2009). Here we argue that public actions aimed at raising fertility should take into 
account also appropriate labour market policies. In the Italian labour market, workers’ flexibility 
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essentially means their precariousness. Precarious workers have low-paid jobs, with scarce or 
nonexistent guarantees in terms of sickness and parental benefits, career prospects and training 
opportunities. Everyday-life experience widely suggests that one of the decisive questions that 
employers pose to female candidates in interviews refers to their civil status and childbearing 
intentions. Temporary female workers are well aware that in most cases a pregnancy would be a 
cause of termination of the work relationship by the employer. The resulting trade-off may be 
unsustainable, both in terms of women’s life-satisfaction and of the economic well-being of the 
couple.  
The demographic consequences of this phenomenon are doomed to become more and more 
important as the share of precarious workers in the labour market constantly grows. The scenario is 
worsened by the dramatic population ageing, which weakens the economic system’s ability to face 
the global competition and blights the sustainability of the pension system. 
In such a context, labour market policies alleviating the precariousness of temporary workers would 
probably lead to more balanced choices in terms of family planning and labour market participation.  
Another interesting insight which this paper adds to the debate refers to the role of bonding social 
capital. The strength of family ties is negatively correlated with an indicator of their quality, and is 
associated with a stronger cultural commitment to reproduction which positively affects 
childbearing intentions. 
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Appendix A. Labour market indicators 
The index of educational qualification ranges from 1 to 8. Categories are sorted in ascending order 
from the lowest level of education. Codes are as follows: 1 = no education; 2 = primary school 
certificate; 3 = lower secondary school certificate; 4 = vocational secondary school diploma (3 
years of study); 5 = upper secondary school diploma; 6 = 3-year university degree/higher education 
diploma; 7 = 5-year university degree; 8 = postgraduate qualification. 
 
The index of participation to the labour market is obtained from the intervieewes responses to two 
questions: 
1) “Was (name) employed in 2006? That is, was he/she in paid employment?”, where possible 
responses where: 1) blue-collar worker or similar (including employees and apprentices, 
homeworkers and sales assistants); 2) office worker; 3) school teacher in any type of school 
(including teachers with term appointments, those under special contracts and similar); 4) 
junior/middle manager; 5) senior manager, senior official, school head, director of studies, 
university teacher, magistrate; 6) member of profession; 7) small employer; 8) own-account 
worker/craft worker; 9) owner or member of family business; 10) working shareholder/partner; 11) 
contingent worker on own account (regular or occasional collaborator, project worker, etc.); 12) 
first-job seeker; 13) unemployed; 14) homemaker (i.e. housewife or househusband; 15) independent 
means; 16) retired worker; 17) pensioner (disability/survivor’s pension/old-age welfare benefits); 
18) student (from primary school up); 19) pre-school-age child; 20) other non-employed (e.g. 
conscript/volunteer/disabled). 
2) “Which was the type of your contract?”. This question was posed only to employees and possible 
responses were: 1) permanent; 2) fixed-term; 3) temporary. 
As stated in section 5.1, the type of contract plays a fundamental role for two main reasons: a) as 
outlined in Section 3, diverse types of contract imply strong differences in terms of  risks of job 
loss, wage variability, intermittent unemployment, training opportunities, workplace conditions, 
parental benefits, and other guarantees; b) a difference in the type of contract may play a crucial 
role in determining the opportunity cost of childbearing as defined by microeconomic theory. 
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Table A1. Index of labour market participation 
Value Categories 
1 
Homemakers, students, others non-employed, unemployed, independent means, 
retired, pensioners. 
2 First job seekers*. 
3 
Atypical workers (i.e. contingent worker on own account (regular or occasional 
collaborator, project worker, etc.), blue-collar workers, office workers, and school 
teachers with temporary contracts. 
4 
Blue-collar workers, office workers, and school teachers with fixed-term contracts, 
junior/middle managers with temporary contracts. 
5 
Blue-collar workers, office workers, and school teachers with permanent contracts, 
junior/middle managers withfixed-term contracts, senior managers, senior officials, 
school heads, directors of studies, university teachers, magistrates with temporary 
contracts. 
6 
Senior managers, senior officials, school heads, directors of studies, university 
teachers, magistrates with fixed-term contracts. 
7 Junior/middle managers with permanent contracts. 
8 
Senior managers, senior officials, school heads, directors of studies, university 
teachers, magistrates with permanent contracts, members of profession, small 
employers, own-account workers/craft workers, owners or members of family 
business, working shareholders/partners**. 
* We assume that first-job seekers involvement in the labour market is quite higher in respect 
of that of unemployed because, on average, they are younger and hold higher educational 
qualification. Thus, their job search actions are likely to be informed by higher expectations in 
terms of income and position. Anyway, estimates do not change if we include first-job seekers 
in category “2”. 
** Members of profession, small employers, own-account workers/craft workers, owners or 
members of family business, working shareholders/partners are all considered as self-employed 
and included in the highest category. 
 
 
Appendix B. Goodness of fit 
The LR Chi-square for model (1) is 419.45 which is higher than the critical value for 10 degrees of 
freedom at any reasonable significance level.  
The pseudo R2 for model 1 is 0.2767, which is comparable with those obtained in the literature. 
The LR Chi-square for model 2 (8 degrees of freedom) is 431.21 which is higher than the critical 
value for 10 degrees of freedom at any reasonable significance level. 
The Pseudo R2 for model 2 is 0.3009. 
The LR Chi-square for model 3 (16 degrees of freedom) is 435.07 which is higher than the critical 
value for 10 degrees of freedom at any reasonable significance level. 
The Pseudo R2 for model 3 is 0.2870. 
The LR Chi-square for model 4 (14 degrees of freedom) is 434.84 which is higher than the critical 
value for 14 degrees of freedom at any reasonable significance level. 
The Pseudo R2 for model 4 is 0.2868. 
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The LR Chi-square for model 5 (11 degrees of freedom) is 429.65, which is higher than the critical 
value for 11 degrees of freedom at any reasonable significance level. 
The Pseudo R2 for model 5 is 0.2834. 
 
Appendix C. Social capital indicators 
 
 
Table C1. Indicators of the intensity of family ties 
Label Variable 
FAMSINGL Singles families for every 100 families of the same area. 
COPFIG 
Couples with children, for every 100 families of the 
same area. 
N_COMPFAM Average number of members of the household. 
FAMAGGR 
Households including more than one family uunit for 
every 100 families of the same area. 
BAMBOCC 
Not married people between 18 and 34 living with a 
parent for every 100 people with the same age living in 
the same area. 
MAD_1KMTOT 
People having their mother living within 1 km 
(cohabitants or not) for every 100 people whose mother 
is alive. 
VEDMUMTG 
People meeting their mother everyday for every 100 
people with non-cohabitant mother of the same area. 
 
 
Since the frequency of encounters and spatial proximity between to different family members 
exhibit a strong correlation, when not collinearity (e.g., the encounters with the mother are collinear 
with the encounters with the father), we preferred to retain measures referring to just one member, 
the mother, instead of taking into account also fathers, sons, brothers, and sisters.  
 
 
Table C2. Indicators of the quality of family ties 
Etichetta Variabile 
NOBABYSIT 
People over 35 who have not cohabitants grandchildren under 13 
who never take care of them for every 100 people with not 
cohabitants grandchildren living in the same area.  
REGALI 
Families with at least two people whose members are used to 
exchange non monetary gifts for every 100 families living in the 
same area.  
SODFAMI 
People aged 14 and more declaring themselves satisfied of 
relationships with their relatives for every 100 people of the same 
area 
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Table C3. Eigenvalues 
Axis Eigenvalues Percentage 
Cumulated 
percentage 
1 5,2672 52,67 52,67 
2 1,4337 14,34 67,01 
3 1,1271 11,27 78,28 
4 0,9885 9,89 88,17 
 
 
 
 
Factor Loadings and Variables Correlations with the first five Axes 
Variable Axis  1 Axis  2 Axis  3 Axis  4 Axis  5 
SODFAMI -0,15 0,17 0,94 -0,15 -0,07 
FAMSINGL -0,85 0,41 -0,03 -0,08 -0,25 
FAMAGGR 0,05 -0,95 0,14 0,17 -0,04 
COPFIGL 0,91 0,17 0,05 0,16 0,13 
N_COMPFA 0,95 -0,17 0,12 0,17 0,08 
BAMBOCC 0,84 -0,02 0,11 0,06 -0,43 
MAD_1KMT 0,93 0,19 0,22 -0,02 -0,05 
VEDMUMTG 0,71 0,15 -0,04 -0,54 0,32 
NOBABYSI 0,60 0,43 -0,23 0,49 -0,08 
REGALI -0,60 0,18 0,31 0,58 0,32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
